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Workers' compensation fundamentally established an ex ante "contract"
between workers and employers, who promised to pay a specified set of
benefits for all accidents arising out of or in the course of employment.
The legislation raised the expected postaccident payments that workers
received as a result of their workplace accidents. In return, workers for-
feited their rights to common law negligence suits. Economic theories of
government intervention suggest several possible alternative explanations
for the adoption of workers' compensation. Interest groups might have
competed for legislation that enabled them to redistribute income in their
favor at the expense of others (e.g., the "capture" or "rent-seeking" mod-
els). Or, faced with some set of market problems, interest groups might
have developed a cooperative solution whereby they all gained. Or alterna-
tively, the program might have been enacted as part of the broad-based
agenda of a political economic coalition.'
The adoption of workers' compensation was not the result of employ-
ers' or workers' "capturing" the legislation to secure benefits at the ex-
pense of the other. Nor can its adoption simply be attributed to the success
of Progressive Era social reformers' demanding protective legislation. Sev-
eral changes in the workplace accident environment in the early 1900s
combined to pique workers' and employers' interests in establishing work-
ers' compensation. The share of the workforce in dangerous industries
rose, state legislatures adopted a series of employers' liability laws, and
court decisions limited employers' defenses in liability suits. All three
changes combined to substantially increase the uncertainty of the negli-
gence liability system. Many employers, facing an increase in the extent
of their accident liability and uncertainty about future changes in this lia-
bility, favored the adoption of workers' compensation by 1910.2 Labor
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unions, growing in strength and increasingly dissatisfied with the results
of employers' liability laws, at the same time shifted their focus from re-
forming the negligence system to fully supporting the transition to work-
ers' compensation. The legislation was enacted so rapidly across the
United States in the1910sbecause most members of the key economic
interest groups with a stake in the legislation anticipated benefits from a
shift away from the negligence liability system. One of the major contribu-
tions of this chapter, therefore, is to document empirically why, if so many
parties anticipated benefits from the legislation, state legislatures waited
as long as they did to adopt workers' compensation.
The groundswell to adopt workers' compensation might be seen as a
national movement that carried nearly all of the states along with it. It
would be a mistake, however, to ignore the activities in each individual
state, where legislatures made the actual decision. Analysis of the timing
of adoption across the United States supports our contention that the
greater uncertainty arising from changes in the negligence system played
an important role in the introduction of workers' compensation. The rela-
tive strength of major interest groups also played a role, as unions, the
manufacturing lobby, and larger and more productive manufacturers
helped speed the adoption of workers' compensation. Finally, social re-
formers played a smaller role in the overall adoption of workers' compen-
sation laws than they did in determining the particular featuressuch as
benefit levels or state insurance of workers' compensation riskof the
legislation in a particular state.
4.1The Formation of a Coalition in Favor of Reform
Workers' compensation incorporated two key features that help explain
why many employers, workers, and insurance companies anticipated gains
from the legislation. First, as shown in chapter 3, the transition to work-
ers' compensation increased the amount of postaccident payments that
injured workers received. Second, workers' compensation essentially al-
lowed employers and workers to establish an ex ante "contract" in which
workers waived their rights to sue in return for a prescribed set of benefits
in the event that they were injured on the job.
Given that workers' compensation significantly raised the levels of post-
accident compensation that workers received, why would employers sup-
port the increase in benefits, which led to such a major de jure redistribu-
tion of income? Roy Lubove(1967)and James Weinstein(1967)claim that
employers supported the legislation as a means of buying labor peace, as
a way to stem the tide of court rulings that increasingly favored injured
workers, and as a way to reduce the costs of settling accident claims. Da-
vid Buffum(1992)argues that employers gained because the new law re-
duced the uncertainty of their accident payments. Employers also were able90Chapter 4
to reduce at least some of the burden of higher accident payments by pass-
ing the costs of workers' compensation back to workers in the form of
lower wages. As seen in chapter 3, the higher expected postaccident bene-
fits under workers' compensation were fully offset by lower real wages for
nonunion coal miners and offset to a large degree for nonunion lumber
workers. Union workers in coal mining and in the building trades, on the
other hand, experienced much smaller wage reductions. Since employers
could pass a substantial portion of the increase in postaccident benefits to
nonunion workers, they were more likely to favor a no-fault compensation
system that was less acrimonious and more certain than negligence lia-
bility.
Given that union members experienced relatively small wage offsets,
organized labor's diligent lobbying on behalf of workers' compensation is
understandable. What is less clear is why nonunion workers, who consti-
tuted about 90 percent of the labor force, supported workers' compensa-
tion. After all, many could expect to pay for a substantial portion of their
new benefits in the form of lower real wages. Workers wouldhave had
little desire to "buy" the higher accident benefits under workers' compen-
sation if they could just as easily have used the risk premiums in their old
wages to purchase their own workplace accident insurance.We have
shown in the previous chapter, however, that workers faced constraints in
trying to purchase the levels of accident insurance that they desired in the
early twentieth century. Unable to reach their desired level of insurance
coverage, families had to rely on household mechanisms, such assaving,
to insure against accident risk. Yet saving was a relatively costly means of
insurance. Thus, even though their wages might have fallen, risk-averse
workers might have benefited from workers' compensation because the
laws provided them with a level of expanded insurance coverage against
workplace accident risk that they had not been able to obtain privately
under negligence liability.
Insurance companies also stood to gain from the passage of workers'
compensation, as long as states did not try to displace private insurers
through the establishment of state insurance funds.3 Because of the ad-
verse selection problems associated with selling individualaccident insur-
ance, insurers stood to gain if the law compelled employers to insure their
entire payrolls. Employers purchased substantially larger amounts of in-
surance under workers' compensation because they were mandated to
provide their entire labor force accident benefits that on average exceeded
those of the negligence system. The insurance industry supported the law
because the switch from selling accident insurance to workers and liability
insurance to employers to selling workers' compensation expanded the
scale of their business. The premiums collected by commercial insurance
companies for workers' compensation insurance rose from zero in 1911 to
$114 million in 1920, despite the presence of compulsory state funds inThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment 91
seven states and competing state funds in ten more. This $1 14 million rise
in workers' compensation insurance nearly tripled our estimate of a de-
cline of $41.5 million in employers' liability premiums.4
One group that might have opposed the introduction of workers' com-
pensation comprised attorneys involved in the practice of workplace acci-
dent law. In Missouri, for example, these damage-suit attorneys used the
political process to slow the adoption of workers' compensation (Kantor
and Fishback 1994a). On the other hand, one of the leading personal in-
jury lawyers in the state of Washington, Guvnor Teats, became one of
the leading advocates of workers' compensation (Tripp 1976, 543). The
transition to the no-fault system did not put workplace accident lawyers
out of business. Instead it shifted the nature of their activities. The issues
for legal action shifted from negligence to determining whether the acci-
dent had occurred at work, the size of the worker's weekly wage, and the
extent of the injury. The number of accident cases that received adminis-
trative attention also rose sharply, so that many workplace accident attor-
neys may have seen their business grow. Further, accident attorneys were
only a small percentage of the bar. In many states attorneys were actively
involved in drafting workers' compensation legislation and a number of
state bar associations supported the legislation.
4.2 Why Workers' Compensation?
If employers, workers, and insurers stood to gain from workers' com-
pensation, then we might have expected to see a significant private move-
ment where workers and employers negotiated private contracts that es-
tablished workers' compensationlike arrangements at the firm level.
Under such a private scheme workers would have signed contracts with
their employers in which the worker, before any accident occurred, waived
his right to a negligence suit in return for a guaranteed set of accident
benefits, regardless of fault. Why was a governmental solution chosen?
Part of the answer to this apparent paradox is that the courts did not
recognize an ex ante contract in which a worker waived his right to a
negligence suit in return for a set of benefits similar to those under work-
ers' compensation. Employers were clearly interested in establishing such
contracts. Writing at the turn of the century, Stephen Fessenden (1900,
1203) claimed that it was "customary" at that time for employers to try to
create these ex ante contracts, but "it has generally been held by the courts
of the United States that a contract made in advance, whereby an employee
agrees to release and discharge his employer from liability for any injury
he may receive by reason of the negligence of his employer, or of his ser-
vants, is contrary to public policy and void. This principle has been an-
nounced by a Federal court in the following well-chosen language: 'As a
general proposition, it is unquestionably true that an employer can not92Chapter 4
relieve itself from responsibility to an employee for an injury resulting
from his own negligence by any contract entered into for that purpose be-
fore the happening of the injury [emphasis added]."5
In addition, twenty-eight states had codified such court rulings through
the passage of laws that held that an ex ante contract did not bar a worker
from filing a negligence suit against his employer.6 The legal environment
relating to workplace accidents in the early twentieth century seems very
similar to the modern setting pertaining to product liability whereby con-
sumers' agreements to release the manufacturer from potential liability
have been routinely ignored by the courts (Huber 1988, 29-30).
In essence, workers' compensation laws established a form of contract
between worker and employer that common law decisions and many state
statutes would not honor. The preaccident nature of the workers' compen-
sation contract was extremely important in expanding the amount of in-
surance that employers could offer their workers. Prior to workers' com-
pensation, the courts allowed firms to offer relief contracts in which an
injured worker's acceptance of benefits after the accident occurred implied
his waiver of future negligence claims. This type of ex post contract was
acceptable, however, only if the employer had contributed significantly to
the firm's relief fund (U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1908, 755). Because
the injured workers could always refuse the postinjury payment and file a
negligence suit, relatively few employers established funds in which they
were the primary contributor. In only 140 of 461 establishmentfunds ex-
amined by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1909, 339, 538-53) in 1908
did employers make contributions to the funds, and in most cases their
contributions were less than one-third the levels contributed by workers.
The employer gained little from contributing to the relief fund because he
expanded the number of workers to whom he was paying benefits, while
not removing the uncertainty of the negligence system. Injured workers
who would have received nothing under the common law could now claim
the guaranteed benefits from the employer's fund, while the workers with
strong cases could still choose to seek large court awards or settlements.7
A final question needs to be answered. Why didn't state legislatures sim-
ply pass laws allowing employers and workers to negotiate their own bene-
fit levels in ex ante contracts?8 Unions and workers pressed hard for the
state to set the benefit levels because they could better negotiate accident
benefits collectively through the legislature than through individual nego-
tiations with employers. The statutes and court decisions outlawing ex
ante contracts were based on the idea that workers, prior to having an
accident, might trade away their rights to negligence suits for too low a
price (Weiss 1966, 568; Johnstone v. Fargo, 184 N.Y 379 [1906]). Workers
and unions were adamant that the workers' compensation laws expand
employers' liability, otherwise they would experience no increase in their
insurance coverage for workplace accident risk. One sign that workersThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment93
succeeded in expanding employers' liability under workers' compensation
was the choice given to employers in states whereworkers' compensation
was elective. After Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. (124 N.YS. 920[1911]) de-
clared the New York compulsory workers' compensation statute for extra-
hazardous employment unconstitutional, the vast majority of states passed
workers' compensation laws allowing employers to elect between workers'
compensation and negligence liability.9 In all of the elective states, how-
ever, employers that did not choose workers' compensation werestripped
of their assumption of risk, fellow servant, and contributory negligence
defenses.
The ex ante nature of workers' compensation contracts allowed the em-
ployer to eliminate the uncertainties of large court awards in return for
providing his workers with a set of benefits that on average were higher
than those under negligence liability. Workers, even if they "bought" the
better benefits through wage offsets, still benefited because they received
better workplace accident insurance coverage than under the negligence
liability system. Meanwhile, insurers found that they could sell more work-
ers' compensation insurance than the combination of employers' liability
and private accident insurance. The analysis does not imply that every
member of the employer, worker, and insurance interest groups gained
from the adoption of the "one-size-fits-all" benefit levels under workers'
compensation. The results of our empirical analyses, combined with quali-
tative evidence indicating wide support among the organizations repre-
senting the major interest groups, does suggest however that the median
member of each interest group expected to gain from workers' compen-
sation.
4.3Changes in the Workplace Accident Liability Climate
The first decade of the twentieth century saw dramatic changes in the
economic and legal environment surrounding workplace accident com-
pensation, and these changes brought workers, employers, and insurers
together in a political coalition favoring workers' compensation. Under-
standing the timing of the enactment of the legislation requires exam-
ination of both national and state-level trends. The workers' compensa-
tion movement was national in scope and after 1910 the legislation was
adopted rapidly across the United States; therefore, in this section we ex-
amine national changes that brought the major interest groups with a
stake in workers' compensation together in favor of reform. The legisla-
tion, however, was adopted and is administered today at the state level.
We further illuminate the factors influencing the passage of workers' com-
pensation in the next section by discussing the results of a quantitative
analysis of state legislatures' decisions to adopt.
Between 1885 and 1910 most reform efforts were devoted to broadening94Chapter 4
employers' liability for workplace accidents. Organized labor pressured
legislatures for limitations on employers' common law defenses, anticipat-
ing that more injured workers would be compensated and the amount they
received would be higher as a result of the laws. They succeeded in ob-
taining the passage of employers' liability laws in quite a few states, as
shown in table 4.1. The number of states with employers' liability laws that
restricted one or more of the employers' three common law defenses for
nonrailroad accidents rose from seven in 1900 to twenty-three by 1911.10
The laws acted as precursors to workers' compensation-style legislation
because prior to 1910 the passage of the liability laws often increased em-
ployers' accident liability, but imposed limits on that liability.
For example, Massachusetts's 1887 employers' liability law was clearly
a compromise. Workers gained a limitation on the fellow servant defense,
making supervisory workers vice-principals of the employer, which meant
that the supervisors' negligent actions could be treated as the negligence
of the employer. Employers gained some security because the law imposed
a four thousand dollar limit on injury damages and death benefits were
limited to a range of five hundred to five thousand dollars. The employers'
prorated share of any insurance fund payment was also applied to this
amount. Further, workers had to file notice of the accident within thirty
days of its occurrence. For the next two decades organized labor pressed
for additional expansions in employers' liability without success (Asher
1969). Finally, in 1909 Massachusetts limited the assumption of risk de-
fense and replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence.
Under comparative negligence a worker's own negligence no longer elimi-
nated his claim for damages but instead reduced the share of the damages
for which the employer was responsible (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1914, 960, 987-91).
In New York between 1881 and 1901 various labor groups proposed
employers' liability laws with little success.11 In 1901 the Workingmen's
Federation of the State of New York (WFSNY)later the New York
State Federation of Laborand the New York railroads both submitted
bills before the legislature. The legislature passed a compromise measure
that was vetoed by progressive governor Benjamin Odell after extensive
protest by organized labor.'2 Finally, in 1902 the WFSNY decided that it
could succeed in weakening employers' defenses only by passing a rela-
tively weak bill. The WFSNY proposal became law, making employers
liable for injuries resulting from the violation of factory laws. Under the
law, workers could sue even if they continued working with knowledge of
the danger, provided that the employer was responsible for the danger and
that workers had assumed only the necessary risks of their occupations.
The bill also required notice of suit within 120 days, a sharp reduction
from the old three-year limit. A series of court decisions in the next year
negated most of the law, and the WFSNY redoubled its efforts to pass new





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































brotherhoods pass a liability law pertaining to railroads, after a 1905 scan-
dal weakened Republican dominance of the legislature. However, bills re-
lating to industrial accidents never made it out of committee in 1907 and
1908. The WFSNY's 1909 proposal met the same fate, but the continued
pressure by organized labor caused the 1909 legislature to establish an
employers' liability commission that was charged with investigating the
liability system and the workers' compensation alternative.'3
Ohio eventually passed employers' liability laws that limited all three
defenses, although most of the expansion of liability occurred in 1910 just
prior to the adoption of workers' compensation. During Ohio's 1904 leg-
islative session, labor and employers' representatives compromised on
an employers' liability reform by passing the Williams Act through a
Republican-dominated legislature. Workers gained because the act im-
posed limits on the assumption of risk defense. In situations where an
employer failed to safeguard a machine, the employer could no longer
escape liability by claiming that a worker who continued to work with the
machine, despite knowing that it lacked protection, had assumed the risk.
Employers agreed to the legislation because it limited their risks of paying
exorbitant damages by imposing maximums of five thousand dollars for
fatal accidents and three thousand dollars for nonfatal accidents.'4 The
Metzger Act of 1908 later established similar limits for railroad workers.
By 1909 both the Democratic and Republican platforms in Ohio called
for a means of financially protecting workers from injury.'5 When the legis-
lature met again in 1910, the Ohio State Federation of Labor strongly
pushed for an expansion of employers' liability. Employers' groups, such
as the Ohio State Board of Commerce, bitterly fought the bills and sought
instead to establish a commission to study the negligence liability system.'6
After a wild series of amendments and counteramendments in both the
House and the Senate, the House agreed to pass the Norris Act as part of
a compromise in which the women's hours bill would not come to a vote. 17
The Norris Act established comparative negligence, defined the fellow ser-
vant defense more narrowly so that supervisors were not fellow servants,
and made employers fully responsible for defects in machinery. Employers
found the final version of the bill easier to accept because the limit placed
on fatal accident damages was lowered from twenty thousand dollars in
the original Norris provision to twelve thousand dollars. In addition, em-
ployers succeeded in getting the legislature to establish a commission to
study employers' liability and workers' compensation.
While the expansions in employers' liability in some states came through
legislation, in others they came through court decisions. The push for re-
form of employers' liability in Washington had begun by the 1 890s. In
every legislative session from 1895 through 1909, at least one bill influenc-
ing employers' liability for workplace accidents was introduced in the
Washington legislature.'8 None of the bills specifically designed to weakenThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment97
the common law defenses of assumption of risk, fellow servant, and con-
tributory negligence were passed, and many died in committee. The key
changes in the compensation of workplace accidents in Washington came
about through significant court decisions.
The first landmark decision, Green v. Western American Company, came
in September 1902 and it sharply limited the assumption of risk defense.
Under assumption of risk a worker could report that a safeguard was
missing from a machine, the employer could send him back to work, and
if the worker was then injured, the employer could escape liability by
claiming the worker had known and assumed the risk of working with the
machine. Washington State Chief Justice W. H. White eliminated this use
of the assumption of risk defense, arguing that it allowed the employer to
use the violation of a law to escape liability.'9
By September 1902 lumber employers were denouncing the courts for
their extravagance in negligence cases. The ratio of losses paid to premi-
ums received for liability insurance in Washington rose sharply from 0.39
in 1901 to 0.56 in 1902, while at least one insurance company left the state
because it had to pay out twice the sum received in premiums. The insur-
ance companies quickly adjusted their rates, so that by 1903 the loss ratio
dropped sharply to 0.30 before stabilizing around 0.40 to 0.47 for the rest
of the decade.2°
Employers in Washington appeared to receive temporary relief in
March 1903 with the passage of the Factory Inspection Act. In one sense
the act was an employers' liability law because employers were considered
negligent for failure to comply with the inspection laws. On the other
hand, employers valued the inspection law because they could have their
workplaces certified as safe after complying with the Washington Bureau
of Labor's recommendations. A number of lower courts in the state began
to recognize the assumption of risk defense again for a number of these
"safe" firms certified to be in compliance. Meanwhile, in a series of cases
known as the "factory act cases," the Washington Supreme Court re-
affirmed that unguarded machinery was a violation of the law and could
not be used to invoke the assumption of risk defense (Tripp 1976, 535).
Employers anticipated further relief from the implications of the Green
decision with the passage of the 1905 amendment to the Factory Inspec-
tion Act. The 1903 act stated that employers were required to offer the
"proper" safeguard, but attorneys said that the courts often held employ-
ers liable even in cases where machinery was safeguarded. The 1905
amendment altered the wording to require employers to offer a "reason-
able" safeguard. In the 1905 Hall v. West & Slade Mill Company decision,
however, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that "reasonable" safe-
guards meant all "necessary" safeguards to prevent accidents (Tripp 1976,
535-37). The court concluded that by virtue of its causing an accident, a
tool or machine lacked necessary safeguards. Joseph Tripp (1976, 535-37)98Chapter 4
claims that the ruling in Hall essentially destroyed assumption of risk and
turned the factory inspection acts into laws that fundamentally changed
employers' liability.
The 1905 ruling initiated a great deal of uncertainty about the extent of
employers' liability, which led to a dramatic jump in court activity. The
number of employers' liability cases contested in the Washington Supreme
Court rose from six in 1904 to thirty-five in 1905 and continued to rise to
fifty-three in 1910 and again in 1911.21 This trend in Washington was
matched by similar trends in most states.
One sign of the increased legal uncertainty engendered by shifts in the
courts' attitude and the new employers' liability laws is the substantial rise
in the number of state supreme court cases related to nonrailroad work-
place accident litigation. If the legal environment and court interpreta-
tions had remained relatively stable, injured workers and employers typi-
cally would have settled out of court, avoiding the high costs of litigating
accident claims. As the liability rulings shifted, the increased uncertainty
would have led the parties to test the bounds of the law in court more
often, as well as to increase appeals to state supreme courts. Evidence on
the number of workplace accident court cases appealed to state supreme
courts is consistent with the view that uncertainty increased markedly
prior to the enactment of workers' compensation. Taking all of the states
together, the number of nonrailroad cases in state supreme courts in-
creased steadily from 154 in 1900 to 490 in 1911 (see table 4.1), an almost
fourfold jump in workplace accident litigation at the highest judicial
level alone.22
The expansion of employers' liability and the greater uncertainty of the
legal system caused a large increase in the liability insurance premiums
that employers paid. In Ohio, for example, the Norris Act of 1910 had an
immediate impact on the compensation that workers received. Payments
to married men in Cuyahoga County rose approximately 16 percent after
the act went into effect.23 Meanwhile, W G. Wilson of Aetna claimed that
the act led to an even sharper increase in insurance premiums, ranging
from 100 to 500 percent. The increase was so sharp that when Wilson
testified before the Ohio Employers' Liability Commission, he denied any
insinuations that "the liability insurance companies were instrumental in
lobbying for the passage of the Norris bill with the obvious purpose of
mulcting our patrons for increased premiums."
Similarly, in Washington the series of court decisions limiting assump-
tion of risk caused employers' liability insurance rates to more than triple
from $0.45 per $100 on the payroll to $1.50 per $100 in 1910 on a new,
model plant with all safety devices installed.25 In general, between 1900
and 1910, total employers' liability insurance premiums collected in Wash-
ington rose more than elevenfold, while premiums for all types of insur-
ance rose only sixfold.26 These same trends occurred nationally. As shownThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment99
in table 4.1, the premiums that all commercial insurance companies col-
lected for personal accident and employers' liability insurance rose from
$63.7 million in 1900 to $225.3 million in 1911 (constant 1967 dollars),
a 354 percent increase. Moreover, this increase in insurers' coverage of
employers' liability was not simply an artifact of an ever-increasing insur-
ance industry, because liability insurance outpaced other forms of insur-
ance. The ratio of accident and employers' liability premiums to life insur-
ance premiums increased from 0.062 in 1900 to 0.115 in 1911 (see table
4.1 ).27 We should note that the increase in aggregate liability premiums
conflates increases in insurance rates with the expanded coverage that em-
ployers may have sought. Even if the increase in liability premiums was
not completely driven by increases in insurance rates, the figures suggest
that the weakening of employers' common law defenses encouraged em-
ployers to pay more attention to accident compensation issues than before.
The increasingly unfavorable legal climate added to the consternation
of employers because it occurred during a time when industrial accidents
were coming to the fore of public attention. In the first decade of the
twentieth century, employment in dangerous industries increased, as did
public awareness of workplace accidents. Shifts in manufacturing employ-
ment toward more dangerous industries between 1899 and 1909 raised the
average accident risk that manufacturing workers faced by approximately
13 percent.28 Meanwhile, the percentage of workers in mining increased
from 2.6 percent in 1900 to 2.8 percent in 1910, increasing the number of
miners by 300,000 and thus the annual death total by about 600 workers.
It is not clear, however, whether the accident risk for specific industries
was rising or falling. Measures of fatality rates for mining and railroading
have the fewest problems with measurement and reporting error during
the period. Table 4.2 shows that fatal accident risk in coal mining rose
roughly 20 percent from 1890 to 1910, from a decennial average of 1.43
workers per one hundred thousand man days in the 1890s to 1.71 in the
1 900s. On the other hand, fatal accident rates in railroading and in metal
and nonmetallic mining appear to have fallen. Even if the true accident
rates within industries were constant, the reporting of nonfatal accidents
was rising sharply in nearly every state department of labor report of the
era, following trends similar to the one displayed for railroad accidents in
table 4.2. Although the upward trends in accident risk might have reflected
better reporting as opposed to true changes in accident risk, social reform-
ers were able to use the statistics as evidence of a growing workplace acci-
dent crisis. The publicity that reformers generated directed substantially
more attention to industrial accidents, along with the related financial
hardship that they caused.
The worsening workplace accident liability climate in the early 1 900s
encouraged employer-supported lobbying groups to explore the possibility
of a switch to a no-fault compensation system. Between 1908 and 1910Sources: Coal mining fatality rates are the number of bituminous coal miners killed in accidents per
thousand employed divided by the average number of days the mines were open in that year (Fay 1916,
10-11). Metal and nonmetal mining fatality rates are reported in Aldrich (1997, 306). The railroad
fatality and nonfatality rate divides the number of railroad employees killed (series Q404) and injured
(Q405), from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 740), by the total man hours worked by railroad employ-
ees from the sample, as reported in Kim and Fishback (1993).
the National Civic Federation, which was composed of leaders from maj or
corporations and conservative unions, devoted substantial time in their
meetings to developing and promoting a workers' compensation bill.
Meanwhile, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) in 1910
called on its members to provide voluntary accident insurance; but then
in 1911 the NAM fully endorsed workers' compensation as a solution to
the accident compensation problem (Weinstein 1967; Lubove 1967). After
forming in 1907, the American Association of Labor Legislation (AALL)
became one of the leading advocates for workers' compensation (see Skoc-
pol 1992, 160-204; Moss 1996)29 The federal government, which often
preceded most employers in offering relatively generous workplace bene-
fits, established workers' compensation for federal workers in 1908 as a
100Chapter 4
Table 4.2 Changes in Fatal Accident Risk in the Early Twentieth Century
Metal and Railroad
Coal Mining Nonmetal Mining Railroad Nonfatal
Fatality Rates Fatality Rates Fatalities Accidents
per 100,000 per 1,000 per Million per Million
Year Days Worked Workers Man-Days Man-Days
1890 1.17 Not available Not available Not available
1891 1.43 Not available Not available Not available
1892 1.47 Not available 10.4 114.9
1893 1.34 Not available 10.3 119.8
1894 1.50 3.39 7.7 98.8
1895 1.56 4.79 7.6 108.5
1896 1.54 Not available 7.4 119.7
1897 1.42 3.82 6.8 110.6
1898 1.43 3.59 7.5 121.0
1899 1.47 2.87 8.0 126.1
1900 1.62 3.18 8.4 130.6
1901 1.51 3.47 8.7 134.3
1902 1.72 2.74 8.3 141.3
1903 1.57 2.40 9.5 159.5
1904 1.72 2.76 9.12 168.4
1905 1.71 3.41 8.30 165.0
1906 1.62 2.98 9.06 176.9
1907 2.08 2.83 9.28 179.4
1908 1.85 2.37 7.40 179.2
1909 Not available Not available 5.92 170.2
1910 1.77 Not available 6.80 192.3
1911 1.66 4.19The Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment 101
result of Theodore Roosevelt's strong support (Lubove 1967, 263-64; John-
son and Libecap 1994).
The employers' shift in interest toward workers' compensation coin-
cided with changing sentiments among organized labor, whose ranks were
rapidly expanding during this time period. Membership in labor unions
increased sharply from 868,000 in 1900 to 2.14 million in 1910, growing
nearly three times faster than the labor force (Wolman 1936, 16). The atti-
tudes of major labor organizations went through a substantial change as
they gained more experience with the results of employers' liability laws.
Around the turn of the century, the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
believed that better accident compensation could be achieved by stripping
employers of their three defenses (Somers and Somers 1954, 31; Weinstein
1967, 159). Organized labor's reluctance to embrace workers' compensa-
tion was part of a more general opposition to government regulation of
the workplace. Union leaders theorized that business interests controlled
politics and, thus, better benefits for workers could be achieved only
through the voluntary organization of workers (Weinstein 1967, 1 59; Skoc-
pol 1992, 205-47; Asher 1969, 457).
After pressuring state legislatures to pass employers' liability laws, orga-
nized labor seems to have become dissatisfied with the results. Large num-
bers of injured workers were still left uncompensated and a substantial
percentage of the insurance premiums paid by employers never reached
injured workers. Organized labor harshly criticized insurance companies
and lawyers as "parasites pure and simple, absolutely unnecessary in indus-
try, yet demanding a part of its created wealth which they have no part in
creating, thereby raising the cost to both producer and In 1909
the AFL switched its position and passed four resolutions supporting work-
ers' compensation legislation and the organization, at the federal level and
through its state affiliates, became a vocal proponent of the legislation.31
Increased interest on the parts of employers and workers in workplace
accidents coincided with, and may have contributed to, the expansion of
states' increasing regulation of the work environment. Table 4.1 shows that
state spending (in constant 1967 dollars) on factory inspections, boiler
inspections, arbitration and mediation, and publishing labor statistics
doubled from $0.09 per employed worker in 1900 to $0.19 by 1910.32 The
increase in spending was often associated with an expansion of state labor
department bureaucracies and in many states the state labor department
itself became an advocate for the introduction of workers' compensation
and further regulation of labor markets.33 In fact, workers' compensation
represented the leading edge of labor legislation during the period. A labor
law index (which excludes workers' compensation) in table 4.1 illustrates
this point. The index remains roughly constant between 1.5 and 2 until
1911 and only rises coincident with or following the first wave of enact-
ments of workers' compensation laws.102Chapter 4
With rising interest by employers and organized labor in workers' com-
pensation, the states began establishing commissions to study the issue.34
Typically, the commissions included a balance of employers' representa-
tives and representatives of organized labor. In the initial meeting in Wash-
ington, when it was discovered that there were few labor representatives,
they actually delayed the meeting in order to obtain more representation
from organized labor (Tripp 1976). These commissions often served as
fact-finding bodies, proposing bills to be considered in the state legislature.
In many cases the commissions would agree on the desire for workers'
compensation but disagree on the features that should be included; there-
fore, multiple bills were proposed for legislative consideration.
The support from major employers' groups and organized labor led to
the widespread adoption of workers' compensation, after a couple of ex-
periments in Maryland in 1902 and Montana in 1909 were declared un-
constitutional.35 Within the next decade, forty-three states adopted work-
ers' compensation. Table 4.3 shows the years in which state legislatures
adopted workers' compensation for the first time, although in some cases
the initial laws adopted by legislatures and signed by the governor were
struck down by courts or referenda. For example, New York passed two
laws in 1910, a compulsory law for extrahazardous employment and a
voluntary law for all types of employment. The compulsory law was de-
clared unconstitutional in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. (124 N.YS. 920
[1911]) as a constitutional taking without due process of law (U.S. Bureau
of Labor 1911, 1 10)36 After amending the state constitution, New York
established another compulsory law in 1913. By 1930 all the states except
Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina had enacted the legis-
lation. As Harry Weiss (1966, 575) noted, "No other kind of labor legisla-
tion gained such general acceptance in so brief a period in this country."
4.4Lessons from the Timing of Enactment across the United States
Variations in the timing of adoption among the states offer some in-
sights into the political pressures that led to the adoption of the legislation.
Economic models of the political process emphasize the importance of
interest groups in determining the adoption of new policies. Since we ar-
gue that employers, workers, and insurers anticipated gains from workers'
compensation, we should expect to see that the law was adopted earlier in
states where employers, workers, and insurers were relatively influential.
The national trends presented in the previous section suggest that changes
in the employers' liability climate led the interest groups to intensify their
pressure on state legislatures. Therefore, we should expect to see earlier
adoption in response to greater average accident risk in manufacturing,













N.Y 1910 (191 3) Compulsory Competitive statec Commission
Cal. 1911 Compulsoryd Competitive statec Commission
Ill. 1911 Compulsoryd Private Commission
Kan. 1911 Elective Private Courts
Mass. 1911 Elective Private Commission
N.H. 1911 Elective Private Courts
N.J. 1911 Elective Private Commission
Ohio 1911 Compulsoryd State Commission
Wash. 1911 Compulsory State Commission
Wis. 1911 Elective Private Commission
Md! 1912 Compulsory Competitive state Commission
Mich. 1912 Elective Competitive state Commission
RI. 1912 Elective Private Courts
Ariz. 1913 Compulsory Competitive state Courts
Conn. 1913 Elective Private Commission
Iowa 1913 Elective Private Arbitration
committees
Minn. 1913 Elective Private Courts
Neb. 1913 Elective Private Commission
Nev. 1913 Elective State Commission
N.Y 1913 Compulsory Competitive state Commission
Or. 1913 Elective State Commission
Tex. 1913 Private Commission
W Va. 1913 Elective State Commission
La. 1914 Elective Private Courts
Ky. 1914 (19 16)a Elective Private Commission
Cob. 1915 Elective Competitive state Commission
Ind. 1915 Electiveh Private Commission
Me. 1915 Elective Private Commission
Montf 1915 Elective Competitive state Commission
Okla. 1915 Compulsory Private Commission
Pa. 1915 Elective Competitive state Commission
Vt. 1915 Elective Private Commission
Wyo. 1915 Compulsory State Courts
Del. 1917 Elective Private Commission
Idaho 1917 Compulsory Competitive state Commission
N.M. 1917 Elective Private Courts
S.D. 1917 Elective Private Commission
Utah 1917 Compulsory Competitive state Commission
Va. 1918 Elective Private Commission
Ala. 1919 Elective Private Courts
N.D. 1919 Compulsory State Commission
Tenn. 1919 Elective Private Courts
Mo.
(continued)
1919 (1 926)a Elective Private CommissionSources: Kantor and Fishback (1998, 559-60). The details of the laws come from Clark and Frincke
(1921), Hookstadt (1918-1920, 1922), Jones (1927), U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin Nos. 126
(1913b), 203 (1917), 243 (1918), 332 (1923), 423 (1926b), and 496 (1929). Information about the late
adopters was taken directly from the states' session laws. The methods of insurance, elective versus
compulsory, and method of administration are the long-run rules established within the first few years
of the passage of the law. Some early states, like California, Illinois, and Ohio, changed their decisions
about these issues within two to four years of adopting the law. The method of administration changed
in a number of states after the industrial commission movement had developed in the later part of
the 1910s.
aSome general laws were enacted by legislatures but were declared unconstitutional. The years that the
law was permanently established are in parentheses. New York passed a compulsory law in 1910 and
an elective law in 1910, but the compulsory law was declared unconstitutional and the elective law saw
little use. New York passed a compulsory law in 1913 after passing a constitutional amendment. The
Kentucky law of 1914 was declared unconstitutional and was replaced by a law in 1916. The Missouri
General Assembly passed a workers' compensation law in 1919, but it failed to receive enough votes in
a referendum in 1920. Another law passed in 1921 was defeated in a referendum in 1922 and an initia-
tive on the ballot was again defeated in 1924. Missouri voters finally approved a workers' compensation
law in a 1926 referendum on a 1925 legislative act (see Kantor and Fishback 1994a). Maryland (1902)
and Montana (1909) passed earlier laws specific to miners that were declared unconstitutional.
'Competitive state insurance allowed employers to purchase their workers' compensation insurance
from either private insurance companies or the state. A monopoly state fund required employers to
purchase their policies through the state's fund. Most states also allowed firms to self-insure if they
could meet certain financial solvency tests.
California and New York established their competitive state funds in 1913.
dme initial laws in Ohio, illinois, and California were elective. Ohio and California in 1913 and illinois
later established compulsory laws.
Illinois' initial law was administered by the courts; they switched to a commission in 1913.
Employees have option to collect compensation or sue for damages after injury.
Compulsory for motor bus industry only.
hCompulsory for coal mining only.
surance premiums, and an increase in workplace accident litigation. Fi-
nally, workers' compensation has been considered one of the progressive
reformer's leading successes. To the extent that this is true, we would ex-
pect states to have adopted earlier in areas where Progressive Era reform
groups were relatively influential.
We have examined the impact of these factors in two ways. First, in the





First Enacted a Elective/Compulsory Method of Method of
State General Lawa (private employment) Insurance" Administration
Ga. 1920 Elective Private Commission
N.C. 1929 Elective Private Commission
Fla. 1935 Elective Private Commission
S.C. 1935 Elective Private Commission
Ark. 1939 Compulsory Private Commission
Miss. 1948 Compulsory Private CommissionThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment105
are nearly equal in numberthose enacting before 1913, between 1913
and 1916, and after 1916. We then compare the mean values for variables
circa 1910 that measure the political strength of interest groups, changes
in the liability climate, and strength of reform groups. The comparisons
indicate the relationship between early enactment and each of these mea-
sures, even without holding the other influences constant. These compari-
sons are reported in table 4.4. It is important to note, however, that the
political process was complicated and the various political economic in-
fluences may have affected that process in competing and conflicting ways.
Second, to examine the impact of each individual factor, controlling for
changes in the other variables influencing the adoption of workers' com-
pensation, we performed a discrete-time hazard analysis, which is dis-
cussed in more detail in appendix H. The hazard analysis allowed us to
incorporate information on the political economic setting for years that
the legislatures met between 1909 and the year of adoption in each state.
Equally importantly, the hazard analysis allows for multiple factors to in-
fluence the enactment decision at the same time; thus, the hazard analysis
enables us to isolate the effect of each variable while holding the influences
of other variables constant.
4.4.1Changes in the Legal Environment
Governing Accident Compensation
Roy Lubove (1967) and James Weinstein (1967) argue that a key reason
why employers supported workers' compensation was the increasingly an-
tagonistic and uncertain legal climate in which accident claims were set-
tled. The passage of employers' liability laws and changes in court inter-
pretations of employers' liability led to higher liability insurance premiums
and an increase in legal uncertainty that generated an increase in court
activity. All of these factors are associated with earlier adoption of work-
ers' compensation.
When states enacted liability laws that limited an employer's common
law defenses, an injured worker's chances of successfully suing his em-
ployer for damages increased. This pressure increased the probability that
the state would adopt workers' compensation. Among states adopting
prior to 1913, 64 percent had employers' liability laws in place in 1910,
compared with only 25 percent among the states adopting after 1916.
After controlling for all factors in the multivariate analysis, the presence
of an employers' liability law for nonrailroad workers that altered one or
more of the three common law defenses raised the probability of adopting
workers' compensation in any one year by a statistically significant 7.9
percentage points. It should be noted that the employers' liability law had
to restrict employers' liability to enhance the chances of adopting workers'
compensation. There were some states that established employers' liability
laws that simply restated the common law without really changing theTable 4.4 Sample Means of Factors Influencing Adoption for States That Adopted Workers'
Compensation before 1913, between 1913 and 1916, and after 1916
Sources: See appendix I.
Note: All of the means are 1910 values, unless otherwise stated.
Variables








Changes in workplace accident liability
Percentage of states with employers' liability law
limiting common law defenses 64.3 55.6 25.0
Percentage of states with employers' liability law
restating the common law 0 27.7 18.8
Mean ratio of employers' liability and accident
insurance premiums to life insurance premiums 0.126 0.118 0.1
Index of workplace accident supreme court cases
(1904-6 = 1) lagged one year 1.52 1.64 1.48
Manufacturing accident risk index 1.35 1.76 1.98
Interest group influence
Mean percentage of manufacturing workers in
establishments with less than 5 workers 5.0 8.5 10.7
Mean percentage of manufacturing workers in
establishments with more than 500 workers 29.5 22.1 17.9
Mean manufacturing value added per worker
(thousands; constant 1967 dollars) 5.00 5.47 4.18
Mean percentage of labor force employed in
manufacturing 35.6 24.1 16.4
Mean percentage of labor force employed in
mining 3.0 4.9 2.0
Mean index of unionization 9.7 9.6 8.1
Mean life insurance premiums per worker
(constant 1967 dollars) 59.0 42.0 31.9
Mean state spending on labor-related
bureaucracy per worker (constant 1967 dollars) 0.24 0.20 0.08
Political climate
Mean progressive law index 4.57 3.5 2.6
Percentage of states in which party control shifted
in the year of adoption in at least one branch
of the legislature 14 35 50
Percentage of states in which party control shifted
in the year of adoption in both branches of
legislature 14 12 33
Mean percentage of presidential vote for socialist
in 1912 6.7 7.0 4.2
Mean percentage of presidential vote for
progressive in 1912 28.7 25.4 19.8
Share of southern states adopting 0.07 0.28 0.63
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employers' de facto liability. The restatement laws were not associated with
earlier adoption of workers' compensation.
The passage of employers' liability laws and changing court interpreta-
tions increased the uncertainty with which employers faced their accident
liability. When legal interpretations were clearly established, both parties
were likely to settle a case out of court to avoid costly litigation. Increased
uncertainty about judicial decisions, however, gave at least one of the sides
greater incentive to seek a court decision, leading to an increase in the
number of cases litigated to a decision. This uncertainty was reflected in
a rise in court cases concerning workplace accidents decided at the state
supreme court level. By 1910 the typical state that adopted prior to 1916
had experienced a rise in the number of court cases of between 52 and 64
percent since the period 1904 to 1906, while states adopting after 1916
had experienced a slightly smaller average increase of 48 percent. In the
multivariate analysis we found that such increases in supreme court activ-
ity raised the probability of adoption of workers' compensation.
The changes in the legal environment contributed to an increase in the
liability insurance rates that employers paid, which in turn increased the
pressure for workers' compensation because employers were uncertain
about the future of these rates. As noted earlier, one proxy for higher in-
surance rates is the ratio of total premiums for employers' liability and
accident liability insurance to the premiums for life insurance in the state.
In fact, the 1910 value for this ratio was about 26 percent higher in states
adopting prior to 1913 than in states adopting after 1916, while the multi-
variate analysis also shows that higher ratios were associated with a greater
probability of adopting workers' compensation.37
We had thought that greater average manufacturing accident risk might
have led to greater pressure for early adoption. To examine the impact of
the shift in manufacturing employment toward more dangerous jobs, we
created an accident risk index based on the manufacturing industrial mix
in each state. Shifts of manufacturing employment into more dangerous
industries did not appear to stimulate earlier adoption of the law. The risk
index was higher for states adopting after 1916 than for those adopting
earlier. Similarly, the multivariate analysis revealed that the risk index had
little impact on the probability of adopting workers' compensation. Thus,
it appears that greater public awareness of accident risk was not nearly as
important as changes in the employers' liability climate.
In general, the results are consistent with the national-level picture
drawn in the previous section. The probability of enacting workers' com-
pensation was significantly higher when employers faced problems with
expanding workplace accident liability. These pressures developed as
states enacted new employers' liability laws, the legal climate in which acci-
dent compensation was adjudicated became more uncertain, and employ-
ers' liability insurance rates increased.108Chapter 4
4.4.2Interest Group Influence
In general, manufacturing workers and employers anticipated gains
from workers' compensation. Meanwhile, farm interests focused on elimi-
nating farm workers from coverage. Once farm workers were excluded,
agriculturalists appear to have been largely indifferent to workers' com-
pensation. As expected, states with more workers employed in manufac-
turing tended to adopt the law earlier. Manufacturing employed on av-
erage 35.6 percent of the workers in states that adopted prior to 1913,
compared with 16.4 percent for states adopting after 1916.
Within the manufacturing lobby, larger and more productive firms
tended to press harder for workers' compensation. These firms might have
benefited more from workers' compensation if they gained a competitive
advantage in the product market because higher postaccident benefits
raised the costs of accident prevention and insurance coverage more for
smaller, less productive firms. Bartel and Thomas (1985) make a similar
argument for why larger, unionized firms support modern Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. The percentage of
manufacturing workers in establishments with more than 500 workers was
29.5 percent in states adopting prior to 1913, compared with 17.9 percent
in the states adopting after 1916. Similarly, manufacturing value added
per worker in 1910 was 20 to 30 percent higher for states adopting prior
to 1917 than those adopting after 1916. At the other end of the size spec-
trum, firms with fewer than 5 workers tended to seek exemptions from
workers' compensation. The exemptions gave the firms the choice of
choosing to join the workers' compensation system, while allowing them
to retain their common law defenses if they remained outside the system.
Although the percentage of workers in establishments with fewer than 5
workers was relatively small in states that adopted earlier, the multivariate
analysis suggests that the small firms' opposition to workers' compensa-
tion was very weak.
Organized labor joined manufacturing interests in strongly supporting
the passage of workers' compensation. The American Federation of Labor
(AFL) actively pursued the legislation after 1909. Yet in some states there
was substantial disagreement within union ranks whether to lobby for
their ideal workers' compensation law immediately or to support a weaker
law in the beginning, with the hope of amending the law later (see Castro-
vinci 1976; Kantor and Fishback 1994a). Although internal disagreements
might have slowed the adoption process in some states, in general, a
greater union presence in a state substantially raised the likelihood of
adoption. We developed a union index for each state to reflect the degree
to which the industries represented in the state were unionized at the na-
tional level. The index is approximately 20 percent higher in states adopt-
ing prior to 1917 than in states adopting after 1916. After controlling forThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment 109
the remaining factors in the multivariate model, the relative impact of the
union index on the probability of adopting workers' compensation was
greater than that of any other variable.
The insurance lobby favored workers' compensation as a means of ex-
panding their coverage of workplace accidents, as long as the state did not
try to establish a state fund to write workers' compensation insurance.
One way to measure the general strength of the insurance lobby is to look
at the amount of insurance business they did in the state relative to the
working population. In this case we use the amount of life insurance pre-
miums paid (in constant 1967 dollars) divided by the number of workers
in the state. We focus on life insurance because that was the most common
form of insurance sold during the period. Note that this measure is sub-
stantially different from the ratio of employers' liability to life insurance
discussed earlier. The life insurance measure captures the overall size of
the insurance industry, whereas the earlier ratio captures the relative share
of employers' liability activity. A comparison of means shows that the life
insurance premiums per worker were $59 in the early adopting states rela-
tive to $31.90 in late adopting states. It should be noted, however, that
the seemingly strong relationship between the insurance lobby and early
adoption is eliminated when we control for other factors in the multivar-
iate analysis. The absence of a strong positive effect might have been
caused by the connection of the issue of state insurance with workers'
compensation in many states. Insurers stood to gain from workers' com-
pensation laws as long as states did not establish their own insurance funds
to compete with or replace private insurance of workers' compensation
risk. As discussed more fully in chapter 6, seven states created monopoly
state insurance funds to fully replace private insurance, ten more set up
funds that competed with private insurance carriers, and state insurance
was an issue in many of the remaining states that never adopted a state
insurance scheme. Even if insurers favored workers' compensation in prin-
ciple, their opposition to workers' compensation bills that included state
insurance diminished the measured impact in the more general adoption
equation.
The final interest group that we assess is the state labor bureaucracy.
State bureaucrats had several incentives to support workers' compensa-
tion. Since both workers and employers sought workers' compensation,
regardless of which group more strongly influenced the labor bureaucra-
cies, they had incentive to lobby for the legislation on behalf of their pa-
trons. Further, the state labor bureaucrats' duties and budgets would ex-
pand if states created industrial commissions to supervise the operation
of workers' compensation. Finally, the labor bureaucrats may have been
useful in publicizing the benefits of workers' compensation. In table 4.4
the comparisons of 1910 data show that state spending on labor issues was
substantially higher in the early adopting states than in the later adopting110Chapter 4
states. However, once we control for other factors in the multivariate anal-
ysis, the state labor bureaucracies had virtually no impact on the adoption
of workers' compensation.
4.4.3Political Climate
Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) find that broad-based politi-
cal economic coalitions may be as important to the adoption of legislation
as narrow economic interests; therefore, we include measures to try to
capture the influence of such coalitions. The leading political movement
around the time of workers' compensation's adoption was the Progressive
Movement, which took different forms in different states. The Progressive
Era altered the nature of the political environment in which workers' com-
pensation was debated in many states. Reform-minded legislators became
influential in many state legislatures in the early twentieth century. They
introduced, along with workers' compensation, such measures as initia-
tives and referenda, direct primaries, mothers' pensions, state tax commis-
sions, compulsory school attendance, state welfare agencies, merit systems
for state employees, minimum ages for child labor, and state commissions
to regulate electricity rates. In addition, reformers unsuccessfully sought
unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours for men, and public health insurance. Potentially, workers'
compensation might have been swept along as part of the progressives'
broader agenda for socioeconomic reform. We have examined the impact
of the Progressive Movement using four measures: the electorate's support
for socialist presidential candidates, the support for Theodore Roosevelt's
progressive presidential candidacy in 1912, variables that measure shifts
in party control of state legislatures, and an index of progressive laws that
each state had adopted to date.
The percentage of the vote won by Theodore Roosevelt's presidential
campaign offers a rough measure of the extent to which voters in each
state supported the nationwide progressive platform in 1912. All three
parties expressed their support for workers' compensation in 1912, SO
the votes for Roosevelt might reflect acceptance of a broader progressive
agenda for socioeconomic and political reform. Similarly, the votes gar-
nered by socialist candidates may reflect the intensity of interest in more
radical reform. As shown in table 4.4, voters in states adopting prior to
1917 were much more likely to support Roosevelt's progressive presiden-
tial campaign than the states that adopted later. Similarly, a higher per-
centage of voters supported socialist candidates in 19 12 in the states
adopting prior to 1917 than those adopting after 1917. The multivariate
analysis reported in appendix H shows that after controlling for other
political economic factors support for Roosevelt's progressive campaign
still had a strong effect on the enactment of workers' compensation, while
the voting for socialist candidates had virtually no impact on the probabil-
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Voting at the presidential level, however, says very little about the im-
pact of reform movements within state legislatures. There is no simple way
to measure the impact of the Progressive Movement and other reform
movements at the state level. The Democratic and Republican party labels
took on different meanings across the states during this time period, as
progressive legislators were found in the Republican and/or Democratic
parties across the United States in the early twentieth century. One way to
capture the effect of reform movements is to measure their success in
adopting other forms of progressive legislation. Therefore, we developed
an index of progressive legislation that each state had in place at any point
in time. The index measures the number of laws from the following list of
progressive proposals that the state had passed: ballot initiatives, refer-
enda, direct primaries, a mothers' pension law, a state tax commission,
compulsory school attendance legislation, a state welfare agency, a merit
system for state employees, a minimum age for child labor, and a state
commission to regulate electricity rates. As shown in table 4.4, as of 1910,
the states that adopted early had an average of 4.6 of these laws, compared
with 2.6 for states adopting after 1917. However, after we control for other
factors in the multivariate analysis, the impact of the progressive law index
is relatively small and we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis of no
effect.
Another way to capture the effect of reform movements is to track shifts
in party control within each state legislature. The multivariate analysis
revealed that shifts in party control had little impact on the probability
of adopting workers' compensation, perhaps because the legislation was
widely supported by all political parties and by workers, employers, and
insurers. The limited impact of shifts in party control on the adoption of
the legislation contrasts sharply with the results using the same legislative
shift variables in our study of the battle over state insurance funds. As
shown in chapter 6, insurance companies and unions fought bitterly over
the state insurance issue, and quantitative analysis reveals that political
power shifts were important factors in determining the adoption of mo-
nopoly state insurance in a handful of states. In general, it appears that
workers' compensation was so widely accepted, while many other Progres-
sive Era reforms were not, because a broad array of interest groups sup-
ported the legislation. Other, more controversial features of workers' com-
pensation, like state insurance, did not necessarily have broad support,
but reformers who championed a wide range of socioeconomic reforms
accomplished their objectives when a political power shift within a state
swept them into the majority.
A cursory look at the timing of adoption across the United States shows
that southern states tended to adopt much later than northern states. Only
7 percent of the states among the early adopters were southern states,
while 63 percent of the states adopting after 1917 were southern states. A
question arises about whether there was something "peculiar" about the112Chapter 4
economic and political environment of the South that led to slow adop-
tion. Gavin Wright(1986)believes that southern labor markets were sepa-
rate from the rest of the U.S. labor market, while Lee Alston and Joseph
Ferrie(1985, 1993)suggest that southern leaders were opponents of social
security and other New Deal social welfare programs. However, once we
control for the extent of the liability crisis, the influence of economic inter-
est groups, and other progressive measures, the multivariate analysis shows
that there was no unmeasured peculiar feature of the South that led to
slower adoption.
4.4.4"Contagion" Effect
When workers' compensation was first being considered, employers
raised concerns that the legislation would put them at a cost disadvantage
relative to their competitors in neighboring states. Given this attitude, em-
ployers may have been more willing to endorse workers' compensation
when they were assured that their rivals in other states had similar labor
costs. In the multivariate analysis, however, we found no evidence of such
a "contagion" effect.
4.5Summary
Workers' compensation was the leading tort reform and labor legisla-
tion of the Progressive Era. It was actively supported by lobbying groups
representing employers, workers, and insurers because most of those in
each interest group expected to gain from the legislation. Employers antic-
ipated a reduction in labor friction, a reduction in the uncertainty of their
accident and court costs, and a reduction in the gap between what they
paid for insurance and what injured workers received. In addition, they
were able to pass at least some of the additional costs of workers' compen-
sation benefits on to their workers in the form of lower real wages. Work-
ers, on average, anticipated higher postaccident benefits from the new leg-
islation. Even if they "bought" the better benefits through lower wages,
they anticipated better "insurance" coverage against workplace accident
risk. In essence, workers could reduce their precautionary saving once the
law mandated that employers bear the majority of the financial burden of
industrial accidents. For their part, insurers believed that the shift to work-
ers' compensation would reduce problems with adverse selection, and thus
they could expand their coverage of workplace accidents, as long as the
state did not become an insurer itself. These gains could only be realized
through the passage of workers' compensation because the courts in the
early 1900sdid not allow employers and workers to write workers' com-
pensationstyle private contracts in which workers waived their rights to
negligence suits prior to an accident. Thus, instead of being imposed from
the top down or from the bottom up, workers' compensation was enactedThe Timing of Workers' Compensation's Enactment 113
because a broad-based coalition of divergent interests saw gains from re-
forming the negligence liability system.
The catalyst that united these interest groups was an increased aware-
ness of workplace accident problems and substantial changes in the liabil-
ity system that governed workplace accident compensation. Across the
country during the early years of the twentieth century, employers experi-
enced increases in the level and uncertainty of their liability, as employers'
liability laws and court decisions altered the traditional negligence system.
Even though the changes in employers' liability largely benefited workers,
labor leaders were dissatisfied with the results because many workers were
still left uncompensated and for those that did receive remuneration, the
amount typically did not replace lost income. Criticism of the negligence
system was widespread across the United States by 1910, thus resulting in
the rapid adoption of workers' compensation legislation across the country.
Some states enacted workers' compensation more quickly than others.
In states where employers' liability was increasing relatively sharply, the
legislation was enacted more swiftly. In addition, workers' compensation
was more likely to be adopted in areas where organized labor and manu-
facturing employers and workers had more political strength. Larger and
more productive employers pressed for adoption even more strongly than
other members of the manufacturing lobby. Support for workers' compen-
sation was not limited to narrowly defined economic interest groups, how-
ever. Greater support among the electorate for the broad-based program
of Progressive Era reformers, as embodied in the support for Theodore
Roosevelt in 1912, appears to have contributed to earlier adoption of work-
ers' compensation in a number of states. In general, workers' compensa-
tion was not the result of one interest group using the political process to
extract benefits at the expense of others. Instead, it was legislation that
united a broad-based coalition of workers, manufacturing employers, and
insurance interests attempting to reform the negligence liability system
that all agreed was ill suited for the modern industrial economy.
Notes
1. See Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) for theoretical treat-
ments of the role of interest groups in shaping regulations. Their models are rich
enough to allow for either a "capture" or multiple interest group framework. For
the classic work on "rent-seeking," see Tullock (1967). Goldberg (1976) and Wil-
liamson (1976) discuss situations in which interest groups might lobby the govern-
ment to correct a market imperfection and the resulting legislation enhance eco-
nomic efficiency. Finally, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) claim that broad-based
political coalitions have been underemphasized as facilitators of government inter-
vention.114Chapter 4
Lubove (1967) explains employers' support for workers' compensation in sim-
ilar terms. He argues that employers sought the legislation because state legisla-
tures and the courts were increasingly favoring injured workers in their efforts to
collect compensation. By contrast, Weinstein (1967) argues that employers sup-
ported workers' compensation as a way to undermine the growing movement
among workers to unionize.
For an analysis of states' decisions to enact state workers' compensation
funds, see chapter 6.
In 1920 the actual level of employer liability premiums was $86 million. Based
on the annual growth rate of employer liability premiums between 1905 and 1911,
the years prior to the adoption of workers' compensation, we estimated that em-
ployer liability premiums would have grown to $129.5 million in 1920. Premium
estimates are from Hayden's Annual Cyclopedia of Insurance (1906, 4, 161; 1913, 4,
117) and Annual Cyclopedia of Insurance (1921, 229-30, 287-88, 465).
See also Clark (1908, 13-14).
In contrast to the U.S. courts, the English courts allowed ex ante contracts to
stand. Clark (1908, 14) found rulings in Georgia (Western & A. R. Co. v. Bishop,
50 Ga. 465 [1873]) and in Pennsylvania (Mitchell v. Pa. R.,I Am. Law. Reg. 717
[1853]) that allowed ex ante contracts that would have barred negligence suits after
an accident occurred. However, the Georgia Code of 1895 included specific lan-
guage that nullified such contracts. Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in a ruling about acceptance of relief benefits as a bar to a lawsuit stated "that an
agreement to accept benefits, the acceptance to operate as a waiver of the right of
action was not contrary to public policy, inasmuch as it was not the signing of the
contract prior to the injury (which would not in itself be effective) but the acceptance
of benefits after the injury that barred the action [emphasis added]." See Johnson v.
Philadelphia R. Co., 168 Pa. 134, 20 A. 854 (1894). In addition to the common law
rulings, Clark and the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1908) found that twenty-eight
states had statutes voiding such ex ante contracts, but many were statutes only
pertaining to the railroad industry. States with laws preventing contracts in rail-
roading included Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. States with gen-
eral laws were California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho (1909), Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Montana, Ohio (1910), and Wyoming (constitution). Missouri had a law
covering railroads and mining and Nevada had a law covering railroads, mines,
and mills (we treated these as general laws). Alabama had a similar law in its 1907
Code that Clark missed because he reported on the Code of 1896. Some states
later passed additional laws against ex ante contracting.
Workers' waiving their rights to a lawsuit prior to an accident was central to
workers' compensation's success. When New Hampshire first adopted the legisla-
tion, for example, workers had the option to choose between a lawsuit and the
workers' compensation benefits after the accident. Employers retained the contrib-
utory negligence defense if the worker chose to go to court. The U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (1917, 74-75) stated that this feature of the law may explain why
only nineteen employers decided to abide by the terms of New Hampshire's volun-
tary workers' compensation law. Arizona had a similar workers' compensation law
but it required employers to join the system. The state completely revamped its
law in the I 920s, and this provision was scrapped.
The state legislatures in the period 1910 to 1920 never experimented with laws
that allowed workers and employers to freely choose their own benefit levels in ex
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1910 established opportunities for workers and employers to sign ex ante contracts,
but the benefit levels were controlled by the state board of arbitration and concilia-
tion in Massachusetts and set by the legislature in New York. No one submitted
contracts for approval in Massachusetts because the one-year limit on contract
duration "rendered it undesirable for employers to formulate plans and to incur
the trouble and expense necessary to operate them" (Massachusetts Commission
for the Compensation for Industrial Accidents 1912, 14-17). In New York only
38 of 440 employees of one firm had consented to the voluntary system by July
1913. The administrative costs of setting up the New York contracts were prohibi-
tive because the employer and each employee had to sign and submit written
agreements to the county clerk, which was a more cumbersome system than the
standard methods of election in later workers' compensation laws (Clark 1914,
116-17).
The following states eventually adopted compulsory legislation: California,
New York, Illinois, Ohio, Washington, Maryland, Arizona, Oklahoma, Wyoming,
Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, Arkansas, and Mississippi.
States had a wide range of laws specific to the railroad industry, but the focus
here is on nonrailroad activity because interstate railroad accidents did not fall
under the domain of states' workers' compensation laws. The vast majority of rail-
road accidents were covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Acts of 1906 and
1908. Some nontrain, noninterstate commerce accidents were handled under state
workers' compensation laws, however. In addition, about eight more states in 1900
had laws that restated the common law without changing any of the basic negli-
gence rules. See appendix U for further details on employers' liability laws of the
early twentieth century.
II. See Asher (1983) for a complete discussion of the campaign for employers'
liability in New York. Many of the bills died in committee. Several passed one
chamber of the legislature before dying in the second chamber, but Asher claims
that this was a standard tactic used by the legislators to reduce criticism that they
were not sensitive to the topic.
The proposed bill would have allowed an injured worker to sue if he had
warned the employer of defects and then continued working. Organized labor was
dissatisfied because the injured worker was required to give notice within sixty
days, compared with an earlier three-year limit, and the burden of proof was on
the worker to prove that he had given notice of the dangerous condition to his
employer (Asher 1983).
Asher (1983) suggests several reasons for organized labor's limited success
in increasing employers' liability in New York. First, organized labor never repre-
sented more than 10 percent of the voting constituency, so their numerical influ-
ence in affecting election outcomes was necessarily limited. Second, there were
divisions within organized labor ranks. The railroad brotherhoods and many other
unions never joined the WFSNY, and even within the WFSNY there was a divi-
sion between the New York City unions and their more conservative upstate coun-
terparts. Thus, in most years, organized labor was politically ineffective. On a few
occasions when politicians felt vulnerable in close elections, however, organized
labor was able to mount strong campaigns because they essentially became swing
voters in the next election. But these opportunities were limited. In the final analy-
sis employers felt increasing pressure in the early I 900s to consider workers' com-
pensation as a viable option because the 1902 employers' liability law led to more
lawsuits and increases in the amounts awarded to workers. Although organized
labor was never able to mount a successful campaign, employers feared the threat
of more drastic laws.116Chapter 4
See Mengert (1920, 5-6). In 1904 Republicans had a four to one majority
in the House and a seven to one majority in the Senate. The Williams bill passed
the Senate twenty-two to four, and the House fifty-seven to twenty-five (Ohio Sen-
ate Journal, 1904, 710; Ohio House of Representatives Journal, 1904, 368). The
Williams bill was infamous because it was lost for a period after it was sent to the
governor for signing. Mengert mentions gossip that opponents of the bill stole it.
The attorney general of Ohio was said to have decided that he could reconstruct
the bill from the records, and the public was told the bill had been found folded
into another bill. See Ohio State Journal, 22 April 1904; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 29
April 1904; Ohio State Journal, 1, 28, and 30 April 1904.
At the same time there were cracks developing in the Republican's conserva-
tive hegemony over Ohio politics. In the 1908 election, Democrat Judson Harmon
was elected governor, despite the Taft presidential victory and the election of a
complete Republican slate for other state offices (Warner 1964, 215, 220; Aumann
1942, 9-10). Harmon was not considered a true progressive, although he sought
to make government operate more efficiently. As a consequence, he felt that great
improvements could be made in delivering compensation to injured workmen.
Most of Harmon's efforts were defeated by a strong Republican legislature in 1909.
The same bill was introduced by Norris in the House (House Bill No. 24)
and Mathews in the Senate (Senate Bill No. 28) seeking comparative negligence,
limits on the fellow servant defense, and further limits on the assumption of risk
defense. The political infighting involved a series of attempts at bill-swapping. Rep-
resentative Brenner in the House led the way for the business groups by proposing
a resolution to delay all action on employers' liability and to form a commission
to study the issue carefully. His proposal included referring the resolution to him-
self as a committee of one to be allowed to report it to the floor of the House at
the proper time. Despite the efforts of progressive legislators Evans of Cleveland
and Ratliff of Cincinnati to get the Brenner resolution referred to the Labor Com-
mittee, the House decided instead to refer the resolution to Brenner's committee
of one. After the Labor Committee reconm-iended the Norris bill for passage,
Brenner sought to amend the bill by fully replacing it with his commission pro-
posal. Brenner's replacement amendment was hotly contested but won by a vote of
fifty-nine to forty-one, with seventeen not voting. The House then quickly passed
Brenner's version of the Norris bill, which established the commission, without
changing the employers' liability law, by a vote of seventy-seven to twenty.
In the Senate the procedure was reversed. Senator Mathews managed to rein-
state the employers' liability language into the bill. An attempt by Senator Pat-
terson to replace the employers' liability language with a commission yet again
lost by a vote of ten to twenty-two. The Senate then passed the employers' liability
version of the Norris Act twenty-six votes to one and sent it back to the House.
The House agreed to pass the employers' liability version of the Norris Act, ninety-
three to five, but it was a compromise in which the women's hours bill would not
come to a vote. This political history is drawn from Foote (1910, 14), Ohio State
Federation of Labor (1910, 10), Ohio House of Representatives Journal (1910, 253,
537-39, 799-803), Ohio Senate Journal(1910, 422-25,449--SO, 479-81), Ohio State
Board of Commerce (1910, 60), Ohio State Journal, 15 and 31 March 1910; 7, 14,
27, and 28 April 1910, and Cleveland Plain Dealer, 15 and 18 March 1910; 5, 7,
27, and 28 April 1910.
The women's eight-hour bill was described by the Ohio Manufacturers' As-
sociation a year later as a "milker pure and simple" and when passed in modified
form was passed "in a spirit of pique because members of the House and Senate
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services in defeating it." In the 1911 General Assembly a huge bribery scandal
developed over such milker bills. In the words of the secretary of the Ohio Manu-
facturers' Association, during the session of the General Assembly over the past
twenty-five years, "to my personal knowledge, there have been introduced a large
number of bills, the sole purpose of which has been to compel persons or interests
to purchase their defeat. For very many years, the persons or interests against
whom these bills were directed felt and believed that the easiest and cheapest way
out was to pay the price demanded, and go on about their affairs" Ohio Manufac-
turers' Association Records (1911).
See House Bills (HB) 310 and 526 in 1895; HB 285 and Senate Bills (SB)
212 and 213 in 1897; HB 294 and 336 in 1899; HB 167 and 406 in 1901; SB 34 and
72 and HB 148 in 1903; HB 98, 129, 178, and 385 and SB 169 in 1905; the "Graves
bill" in 1907; and SB 171, 205, and 217 in 1909 from volumes Washington Senate
Bills and Washington House Bills, various years. Some of these bills focused on
safety regulations, which affected employers' liability by establishing what was con-
sidered employer's negligence.
The Green case was a coal mining case. A miner asked for more timbers to
support the roof. His foreman said there were no more timbers, so the miner quit
for the day. The next day there were still no timbers, the miner started working
and was harmed. See report of the Green decision in 30 Wash. 87-1 16 (1902); see
also Tripp (1976, 533).
See Washington Insurance Commissioner (1902, 47, 60; 1904, 25, 38; 1906,
32, 47; 1908, 30, 44; 1909, 27, 31; 1910, 28; 1911, 41); see also Tripp (1976, 534).
The exception to the rise was a drop in cases to twenty-nine in 1907. The
number of Washington Supreme Court cases was compiled from Washington Re-
ports, 1904 to 1911. The increase in the cases probably signals an increase in the
uncertainty about how the law would be applied.
We focused on nonrailroad cases and railroad nontrain cases because these
were the types of accidents covered by workers' compensation laws. The trend in
table 4.1 is unchanged when railroad cases are included. Including railroad cases,
the number of state supreme court cases rises from 220 in 1900 to 640 in 1909,
declines to 551 in 1910, and rises to 609 in 1911.
We ran trend regressions for each state and found that in thirty-one states the
increased number of cases was statistically significant. In sixteen states there was
no statistical trend and in one state there was a statistically significant downward
trend. Thus, the pattern for the United States shown in table 4.1 was widespread
across the country and not driven by a handful of litigious states.
Ohio Employers' Liability Commission (1911, xxxix).
Ibid., 204, 210.
Washington Industrial Insurance Department (1912, 19).
Washington Insurance Commissioner (1902, 47, 60; 1910, 28; 1911, 41).
We ran trend regressions for each of the states and found that in thirty-nine
states there was a statistically significant increase in the ratio. In seven states there
was no statistical trend and in two states there was a statistically negative trend.
We created a workplace-accident risk index based on each state's industrial
mix and the premiums that employers in each industry paid per one hundred dol-
lars on the payroll into the Ohio State Workmen's Compensation Fund in 1923
(see Ohio Industrial Commission 1923). Ohio had a wide range of industries and
the Ohio Industrial Commission sought to price the insurance based on actuarial
experiences. We matched the premiums for each industry with the average employ-
ment in that industry in each state in 1899 and 1909. The risk index is the weighted
average of the insurance premiums across industries using the average employment118Chapter 4
in each industry as weights. Changes in the risk index between 1899 and 1909 are
caused only by changes in the distribution of employment across various types of
manufacturing. The index rose from 1.3 in 1899 to 1.5 in 1909.
Weinstein (1967, 162) claims that the AALL represented the interests of
large employers, accepting funding from Gary, Rockefeller, and Macy. Moss (1996)
claims, however, that the AALL was more independent because it was led by aca-
demic economists like John R. Commons, who called for many reforms that em-
ployers opposed.
Ohio State Federation of Labor (19 ISa, 23-25).
The transition in the attitudes of employers and organized labor are illus-
trated by Asher's (1969) research on Massachusetts. Although the issue of workers'
compensation was broached in the 1903 committee, organized labor's solution was
to push for a further expansion in employers' liability. In 1904 organized labor's
adamant demand to retain the right to sue for damages as part of any workers'
compensation bill destroyed whatever small chance Massachusetts had of passing
a workers' compensation bill (p. 457). Annually between 1905 and 1907 organized
labor in Massachusetts lobbied unsuccessfully for employers' liability bills that
would have limited the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses.
The failure to achieve their objectives during this period may have caused the labor
leaders to change course. In 1907 a committee was formed to consider both em-
ployers' liability and workers' compensation bills during the legislative recess. La-
bor leaders on the committee began to favor workers' compensation, as did leaders
from the Massachusetts Civic League. In 1908 the committee endorsed the so-
cial principle of workers' compensation and the legislature passed a bill allowing
employers to voluntarily establish no-fault accident compensation plans that re-
sembled the workers' compensation programs to come later. No employer created
a plan, however. By 1910, the Massachusetts Federation of Labor, the Boston
Chamber of Commerce, and the New England Civic Federation all had become
interested in a workers' compensation bill, although each group had its own ideas
about what the bill should look like. The nature of their compromise is discussed
in chapter 5.
State-level regressions show that in thirty-one states real spending on labor
issues increased at a statistically significant trend. In eight states there was no
statistical trend and in four there was a statistically negative trend, primarily be-
cause nominal spending remained constant over the period. Five states had no
spending on labor issues during the period.
For an example of early labor department advocacy for workers' compensa-
tion, see Minnesota Bureau of Labor Statistics (1893, 117-55).
Commissions were established in Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin in
1909; Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri (appointed by governor), Montana (ap-
pointed by governor), New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington (appointed by governor)
in 1910; Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ore-
gon (appointed by governor), Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia (appointed
by governor) in 1911; Louisiana in 1912; and Indiana, Maryland (appointed by
governor), Tennessee, and Vermont in 1913.
The Maryland legislature in 1902 was the first to actually adopt a compensa-
tion law that set out to provide guaranteed benefits to injured workers in several
hazardous industries. But because the legislation gave the insurance commissioner
judicial powers and deprived injured workers of the right to a jury trial, it was
ruled unconstitutional two years after its passage. And in 1909 the Montana legis-
lature passed a compulsory compensation law that pertained only to the coal min-
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tions into a cooperative insurance fund, it still allowed an injured employee (or his
family) to sue for damages under the old liability system. Since the law forced the
employer to bear a double burden, the Montana Supreme Court ruled it unconsti-
tutional in 1911 (Weiss 1966, 571).
See chapter 5.
Recall that total employers' liability premiums may have increased either
because rates increased or because more employers chose to insure their accident
liability risks. Since the multivariate analysis controls for changes in manufacturing
accident risk and for the change in employers' liability laws, the measured impact
of the insurance ratio might suggest that employers saw workers' compensation as
a means to control their insurance costs.